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Racing Syndicates as Securities*
By RUTHEFORD B

CAMPBELL, JR.**

INTRODUCTION

It is not difficult to understand why horses like Devil's Bag,
Chief's Crown and Spend A Buck are syndicated during their
racing careers. The owners of such horses find themselves with
an asset worth millions of dollars, but the asset has the potential
to decrease significantly in value if the racing fortunes of the

horse change. That creates pressure for owners to disinvest, at
least partially, and spread the risk of loss. Investors, on the
other hand, are often just as anxious to invest. Not only is there
the chance of earnings and appreciation if the horse continues
to win, but perhaps more importantly, the syndicate may provide
a once-in-a-lifetime chance to own a Kentucky Derby winner or
even a Triple Crown winner.
These same fundamental pressures are present in less expensive racing syndicates. Owners of less expensive horses also want
to spread risk; investors similarly want to share in earnings,
appreciation and excitement of owning a successful racehorse.
Whatever the horse's value, the formation of racing syndicates invariably involves significant and complicated issues under
federal securities laws. This Article addresses these problems,
shares certain observations and criticisms on these matters and
provides advice on how to structure racing syndicates in ways
that minimize the burden of federal securities laws.
* This Article should be considered in connection with the author's previous
piece, Campbell, Stallion Syndicates as Securities, 70 Ky. L.J. 1131 (1981-82). Each
article provides analyses and information relevant to the other.
** Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, Centre College; J.D.
1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1971, Harvard University.
*** The author thanks Mark Metcalf and Mark Medlin for their assistance in the
preparation of this Article.
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TERMS OF RACING SYNDICATES

Racing syndicates are basically similar to breeding syndi-

cates.' Each involves the joint ownership of a horse pursuant to
a contract, the syndicate agreement, that governs the rights and
obligations of the joint owners ("co-owners"). The co-owners
of the interests in a racing syndicate ("fractional interests"),
however, are not, at least initially, concerned about breeding the
horse. Instead, the purpose of a racing syndicate is to race the
animal, and that necessarily requires terms different from breeding syndicates.

In a racing syndicate, therefore, provisions must be made
for handling the expenses and income generated by racing the
horse. Typically, the expenses are divided equally among the co-

owners according to their ownership interest in the horse. Although provisions may vary, the winnings are also usually shared
equally by the co-owners, perhaps after 2 deducting each owner's
share of the unpaid syndicate expenses.

In addition, arrangements must be made regarding the control and supervision of the horse's racing career. For practical
reasons, it is difficult to involve all of the co-owners in the day-

to-day decisions of a racing career. Decisions concerning jockeys,
racing schedules and veterinary care, for examples, must be made
expeditiously and, as a result, the syndicate agreement usually
I For a discussion of breeding syndicates, see Campbell, Stallion Syndicates as
Securities, 70 Ky. L.J. 1131 (1981-82).
- The following language appeared in one major racing syndicate:
From and after the date of this Agreement, the Co-owners shall share the
expenses and earnings of the Colt in proportion to their ownership interests.
Such expenses shall include all costs and expenses incurred in connection
with the care, training and racing of the Colt including, but not limited
to, boarding, training, veterinary, and racing fees and expenses, the cost
of liability insurance hereinafter provided for, and for any other fees and
expenses actually and reasonably incurred by the Owners in actively training
and racing the Colt. To the extent earnings are available to offset expenses,
they shall be so used. The Owners shall account to the Co-owners on at
least an annual basis for all items of income and expense. The Owners
shall bill each Co-owner for his share of expenses on such basis as the
Owners may deem appropriate, but not more frequently than monthly.
The expenses so billed shall be payable by each Co-owner within ten (10)
days of the date of billing. All racing trophies or other objects of value
(except monies received) awarded on account of the performances of the
Colt shall be the sole and absolute and permanent property of [the Owners].
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delegates responsibility for the care of the horse and the supervision of the racing career to the syndicate manager or to some
other person or small group. The delegation is typically broad,
usually giving the syndicate manager essentially unfettered con3
trol over the racing career of the horse.

Even though racing is the most immediate purpose for the

formation of a racing syndicate, the major value component of
many syndicated animals is derived from the animal's breeding
potential. As a result, racing syndicates often include all of the

terms of a breeding syndicate. Such provisions, which become

The following language from two racing syndicates concerns the allocation of
responsibilities to the syndicate manager:
[1] [The Colt] is now in active training and racing under the management
and supervision of [X]. The Colt shall continue in active training and
racing under the principal supervision and control of [X]
. ., which
supervision and control shall be with the advice and consent of [Y]. In the
event any conflict should arise in said supervision and control, [X] shall
have final and ultimate decision-making authority.
[2] The owner designates the Syndicate Manager to have the sole and
exclusive possession of the Colt and the sole and exclusive discretionary
right, power and authority, subject to the further provisions of this paragraph, to manage and supervise the boarding, training, development and
racing of the Colt, including, but not limited to: (a) selection of where the
Colt shall be boarded, trained and raced, and under whose direct supervision such activities will occur; (b) selection of the trainer of the Colt and
determination of the conditions, including compensation, under which the
Colt shall be trained; (c) selection of the races to which the Colt will be
nominated and the races in which he shall actually start; (d) selection,
employment and compensation of jockeys, farriers, veterinarians and other
like support personnel; (e) determination of when and under what conditions the Colt shall be retired from racing ... ; (f) the selection of accountants and attorneys and their compensation; (g) the procurement of a policy
of public liability insurance in the amount of not less than [$X] ...
insuring the Co-owners, the Syndicate Manager, and the agents, servants,
employees of the Syndicate Manager against loss or liability to any person
whomsoever by reason of the negligence of any of the said persons in the
boarding, training, racing, and other use of the Colt (provided that the
Syndicate Manager shall be obligated to procure such insurance); and (h)
in general, the Colt's racing career. Notwithstanding the above provisions,
the Syndicate Manager shall consult with Owner from time to time with
respect to decisions affecting the Colt's racing career, and it is agreed that
[A] shall be the trainer of the Colt and that he shall select the races to
which the Colt will be nominated and the races in which he shall actually
start, unless Owner and Syndicate Manager unanimously determine otherwise.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74

effective upon the horse's retirement from the track, permit a
smooth transition from racing to breeding and minimize the
chances of surprises for the co-owners.
There are, of course, other matters that must be treated in
a racing syndicate agreement or related documents. Examples
include provisions regarding the sales price and terms of payment
for the fractional interest, insurance and warranties and representations of health and fertility. The scope of this Article,
however, does not necessitate any detailed consideration of these
latter provisions.

II. THE CASES AND THE COM~ASSION
A.

The Cases

When structuring a racing syndicate, one must consider
whether interests in such a syndicate constitute Securities under
federal law. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 4 the most important
case in that regard, the United States Supreme Court laid down
its now classic four-part test 5 for a security, stating that a security
involves (1) an investment (2) in a common enterprise (3) with
an expectation of profits (4) derived solely from the efforts of
6
the promoter or some third party.
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.7 is representative of a
series of cases8 involving an important theoretical development
in the Howey test. In Koscot, the court concluded that the

328 U.S. 293 (1946).
Commentators and courts sometimes separate the Howey test into only three
elements. See, e.g., FitzGibbon, What is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility
to Participatein the FinancialMarkets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 900 (1979-80); SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1974). A recent case in the
Eastern District of Kentucky, Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp 6 (E.D.
Ky. 1985), recognized that there are four elements to the Howey test. Id. at 8.
328 U.S. at 298-99.
7 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
Other cases using the same standard as Koscot include: Union Planters Nat'l
Banks v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1980);
Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 193, modified on other
grounds, 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912,
914-15 (8th Cir. 1976); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973);
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973).

1985-86]

RACING SYNDICATES

language in Howey's fourth element, which requires that the
investor rely "solely" on the efforts of the promoter or third
party, should not be read literally. Instead, the court held that

the requirement would be met if the efforts of the promoter or
third party were "the undeniably significant ones, those essential

managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise." 9
Although a number of earlier cases are relevant to the de-

termination of whether interests in a racing syndicate are securities,' 0 Howey and Koscot generally provide the basis for any

analysis. 1kThere is, however, a recent district court case, Kefalas
v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc.,' 2 that deserves mention, because it

is the first time that a federal court directly faced the question
of whether a horse syndicate involves a security under federal
law.'3

497 F.2d at 483 (quoting 474 F.2d at 482).
For a discussion of these cases, see Campbell, supra note 1, at 1135-46.
"In a recent decision, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297 (1985),
the United States Supreme Court rejected the sale of business doctrine and thus held
that the federal securities laws apply to the sale of 100% of a closely held corporation's
stock. Id. at 2306-08. In its opinion, the Court attempted to limit, preserve and explain
the applicability of the Howey analysis, which the Court had thoroughly confused in its
prior decision, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). In Landreth Timber, the
Court indicated that the Howey analysis should be used in instances involving "unusual
instruments not easily characterized as 'securities.' " 105 S. Ct. at 2304. It seems clear,
then, that Howey is the analysis that generally should be applied to racing syndicates.
The same day the Supreme Court decided Landreth Timber, it also handed down
its decision in Gould v. Ruefenacht, 105 S. Ct. 2308, 2310-11 (1985), also rejecting the
sale of business doctrine.
Prior to Landreth Timber, there was a split among the circuits regarding the sale
of business doctrine. Compare Sutter v. Groen, 687"F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982) (reaffirming
the position of the Seventh Circuit that the sale of a business does not constitute the
sale of a security) with Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983) and Golden v.
Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (both cases rejecting the sale of business doctrine).
For articles discussing the sale of business doctrine prior to Landreth Timber, see Easley,
Recent Developments in the Sale of Business Doctrine. Toward a Transactional ContextBased Analysis for FederalSecurities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAW. 929 (1983-84); Seldin,
When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of Business" Doctrine Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 (1981-82); Thompson, The Shrinking Definition of
a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is Not a Federal Security
Transaction, 57 N.Y.U.L. REv. 225 (1982); Thomas, A New Look at lob-5: The Sale
of Business Doctrine, 33 SYRACuSE L. REv. 999 (1982).
" 630 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
" There have been state decisions, however, on the question of whether interests
'o
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The plaintiffs in Kefalas purchased fractional interests in
three thoroughbred stallions syndicated pursuant to breeding
syndicate agreements containing fairly standard terms. Specifically, each co-owner was entitled to one breeding right ("nomination") to the stallion each year. The nominations could, in
the discretion of the co-owner, either be sold or utilized in the
co-owner's own breeding program. As is typical in such syndicates, the co-owners agreed to share pro rata the expenses as4
sociated with each stallion.
The Kefalas court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that two elements of the Howey test
were not met and that, accordingly, the fractional interests did
not constitute securities under federal and state laws. The court
found that the Howey "common enterprise" (or, as the court
called it, "common venture") requirement was not satisfied,
because there was no "horizontal commonality" among the coowners.' 5 That test, according to the court, requires that "the
fortunes of the individual investor ... [be] tied to the success
of the venture as a whole.' 6 Although the court found that an
increase in the stallion's reputation would benefit all co-owners,
the court concluded that the co-owners' greatest expectation of
profit came from "the value of the offspring-a value dependent
in large part on the quality of the mare, the work of the trainer,
and the fortunes of the foal's racing season."' 7 These were
factors that the court considered to be independent of the "success of the venture as a whole." The court ended its analysis
metaphorically, stating that "[a] rising tide, in this case an

in horses are securities under state blue sky laws. See Brown v. Rairigh, 363 So. 2d 590
(Fla. 1978) (not a security because no common enterprise if only one investor); Marshall
v. Harris, 555 P.2d 756 (Or. 1976) (interest in race horses and their earnings constitute
a security because it is an investment contract under Howey).
'4

See 630 F. Supp. at 7.

11Id. at 8. The Sixth Circuit has required horizontal commonality. See Curran v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221-24 (6th Cir. 19S0),
aff'd., 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. Commercial
Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1183 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124
(1981).
,6630 F. Supp. at 8 (citing 651 F.2d 1174).
17

Id.
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increase in the value of the nomination, will not lift all boats to
8
the same height.'1
The court also found that the efforts of the promoters and
syndicate managers were not sufficiently significant to meet the
fourth element of the Howey test. Although the bare terms of
the syndicate agreement clearly support such a conclusion, there
were allegations that the plaintiffs "owned no mare of their own
and expected the defendants to sell their nominations"' 9 and
that the defendants represented to the plaintiffs that they (i.e.,
the defendants) "would sell the plaintiffs' nominations to other
breeders. ' 20 These allegations, however, were not sufficient to
defeat the defendants' motion for summary judgment. In that
regard, the court relied heavily on the syndicate agreement,
which the court described as providing:
that the syndicate manager would do no more than furnish
a list of breeders who had inquired as to the availability of
nominations. Selling these nominations would be the job of
the owner, and any profits derived would necessarily depend
on the skills and efforts of the owners rather than those of
the syndicate manager.'
Although Kefalas represents no major conceptual development in the definition of a security, it is a significant application
of traditional Howey concepts, especially in light of the procedural setting of the case. The court's willingness to grant a
defendant's motion for summary judgment, even in the face of
plaintiffs' allegations concerning the syndicate manager's additional undertakings, indicates that one may be able to assign the
syndicate manager duties and responsibilities beyond those presently sanctioned by the no-action letters of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("Commission"). 2 More specifically, the
case reflects at least one court's opinion that promises by a
syndicate manager to sell nominations on behalf of the co-

1. Id.

Id. at 7.
"Id.
Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
For a discussion of the Commission's position, see the text accompanying notes
23-38, infra.
'
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owners will -not necessarily create a security. All of this should
provide some comfort to persons who wish to expand the tra-

ditional responsibilities of the syndicate manager.
B.

The Commission
The Commission continues to take a hard line on the defi-

nition of a security, 23 especially when applying that definition to

1 The Commission has issued more than 60 no-action letters dealing with the
question of whether interests in horses are securities. Interco Syndicate, SEC No-Action
Letter (available Aug. 8, 1985); Top Ten Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available
July 29, 1985); Cals Neat Star Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 17,
1985); Rhaladdinn Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 28, 1985); Turn
of the Moon Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 28, 1985); Threat's
Supreme A and Super Stock Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 11,
1985); IBN Shamus Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Jan. 9, 1985); Silver
Ring Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Jan. 28, 1985); Syndication of Daniri,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 26, 1984); *ETIW Syndication, SEC No-Action
Letter (available Nov. 2, 1984); Bay Hilal Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Oct. 15, 1984) (SEC refused to take no-action position because stallion could be sold
and profits shared among investors); Bakkarat Syndication Agreement, SEC No-Action
Letter (available Jan. 9, 1984); El Jefe Gitano Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 26, 1984); Arn-Ett Perlanet Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Oct. 27, 1983); Elkanada Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 8, 1983);
Baske-To Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 30, 1983); Gai Robert
Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 7, 1983); El Rim Syndication, SEC
No-Action Letter (available June 10, 1983); Jack's Doe Frost Syndication, SEC NoAction Letter (available June 6, 1983); Especial Effects Syndication, SEC No-Action
Letter (available May 20, 1983) (SEC refused to issue no-action letter); El Repaso
Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available May 6, 1983); Bay Dubonnet Syndicate,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 30, 1983) (no action after amendments, confirmed
original no-action letter of Apr. 29, 1983); Shorty Lena Syndicate Agreement, SEC NoAction Letter (available Mar. 24, 1983); GDANSK Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter
(available Mar. 4, 1983); Huckleberry Bey Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter
(available Jan. 1, 1983); Forbis, Donald L. and Judith E., and Zichy-Thysson Investment
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 30, 1982); Red Dee Hobby Venture, SEC
No-Action Letter (available Nov. 29, 1982); Majestic Arabians, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter (available Oct. 13, 1982); Dave Parker Quarterhorses, SEC No-Action Letter
(available July 8, 1982); Gin & Peppy Horse Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available June 25, 1982); Eskimos Stallion Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Apr. 15, 1982); Secret Passage Syndication Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Feb. 22, 1982); Himito Dancer Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Feb. 5, 1982); Dale Ross Lloyd & Lake, SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 14,
1981); Blaze Drift Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 29, 1981); B.F.
Phillips, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 21, 1981); Markegard, Roy L., SEC
No-Action Letter (available June 11, 1981); New Frontier Investments, Inc., SEC NoAction Letter (available June 4, 1981); Owens, Marjorie, SEC No-Action Letter (avail-
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horse syndications. 24 For example, there is no indication that the
Commission has backed off its reflexive aversion to all syndicates
containing provisions for income pooling. 25 As a result, the staff

able Feb. 27, 1981); Carrico, Norman T. and Paula, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Dec. 12, 1980); Winger, Richard, SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 21, 1980);
Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 8, 1980); Ariston
Syndication Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available June 23, 1980); Downing,
Cathy and Marianne, SEC No-Action Letter (available June 23, 1980); Ostrer Brothers,
SEC No-Action Letter (available June 23, 1980); Murphy, Gregory J., SEC No-Action
Letter (available May 5, 1980); Khemosabi Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Feb. 19, 1980); J.E. Garrett, SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 20, 1979); Darrell
Keener, SEC No-Action Letter (available Apr. 23, 1979); B.F. Phillips, Jr., SEC NoAction Letter (available Apr. 9, 1979); Reese Evans Howard, SEC No-Action Letter
(available Feb. 23, 1979); Schenck, Ralph E., Jr. and Diana, SEC No-Action Letter
(available Nov. 20, 1978); Stallions Unlimited, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (available
Nov. 13, 1978); Kennaugh, Robert Q., SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 12, 1978);
Rheusdasile, Jerry, SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 11, 1978); B.F. Phillips, Jr.,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Sept. 21, 1978); B.F. Phillips, Jr., SEC No-Action
Letter (available Mar. 23, 1978); B.F. Phillips, Jr., SEC No-Action Letter (available
Feb. 16, 1978); Crumpler, Paul, SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 3, 1977); John
R. Gaines, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 18, 1977); Pink Lady Farms, SEC
No-Action Letter (available July 18, 1977); J.D.A. Farms, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter
(available Dec. 29, 1976).
There is one area, however, in which the Commission may have softened its
position. In my previous article, I reported the Commission's unwillingness to issue a
no-action letter if the syndicate manager agreed to sell unused nominations on behalf of
individual syndicate members. See Campbell, supra note 1, at 1151-54. Since that article,
the SEC has issued no-action letters in situations in which the syndicate manager (or
some other related party) agreed to "assist" the members in selling nominations. Rhaladdinn Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 28, 1985); Turn of the Moon
Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 28, 1985); GDANSK Syndication, SEC
No-Action Letter (available Mar. 4, 1985). It appears, however, that this activity must
be quite limited to satisfy the staff. For example, in El Repaso Syndicate, SEC NoAction Letter (available May 6, 1983), the original request letter indicated that one of
the original owners "will agree to act as agent for owners wishing to sell unused
breedings." Letter from Robert R. Estes to Norman Schou, Securities and Exchange
Commission (Dec. 7, 1982) (requesting no-action letter) (letter appended to El Repaso
Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available May 6, 1983)). In a subsequent communication with the staff, however, the attorney stated that the original owner "will not be
involved in any selling activities of promotional efforts on behalf of the owners of the
shares." Letter from Robert R. Estes to Ms. Charlene Bell, Securities and.Exchange
Commission (Mar. 7, 1983) (letter appended to El Repaso Syndicate, SEC No-Action
letter (available May 6, 1983)). Obviously this change was pursuant to negotiations with
the staff.
- Requests for no-action letters continue to recite the absence of pooling. See,
e.g., GDANSK Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 4, 1983). In Top Ten
Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 29, 1985), the staff specifically made
inquiries regarding pooling. See Letter from Robert W. Hedquist to Don Bobbitt,
14
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will not issue a no-action letter regarding a breeding syndicate
if, for example, the syndicate agreement provides for the sale of
seasons and the pro rata distribution to co-owners of the sale
26

proceeds.

This is of obvious importance to racing syndicates, in which
winnings are normally pooled and distributed pro rata to the coowners. It seems, therefore, that for this reason alone the Commission will refuse to assume a no-action posture toward a racing
syndicate.
The staff also apparently has concluded that any syndicate
agreement containing provisions for a futurity fund involves a
security. 27 Futurity funds, most prevalant in show horse breeding
syndicates, are funded by required annual contributions from
the co-owners. The fund then supplements the awards made to
progeny of the syndicated stallion in the event that the progeny
win certain designated events.
The conclusion that futurity funds cause syndicates to involve
securities is, in this writer's view, inconsistent with the United
States Supreme Court's decision in InternationalBrotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel.28 There the Court held that participation

in a compulsory, non-contributory pension plan did not involve
the purchase of a security. One reason for this conclusion was
that the participant's expectation of payment from the plan did
not depend sufficiently on the fund managers' efforts. Although
the Court conceded that benefits to participants depended "to
some extent on earnings from [the fund's] assets ' 29 (actually,
the fund managers' investments had generated seventeen percent
Securities and Exchange Commission (June 11, 1985) (letter appended to Top Ten
Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 29, 1985)).
16See Campbell, supra note 1, at 1154-58. The staff has, however, issued noaction letters when the syndicate agreement provides for the sale of one nomination to
generate the cash necessary to pay for Breeders Cup fees (i.e., to pay the fees necessary
for the stallion's participation in the Breeders Cup program). Syndication of Daniri,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 26, 1984).
"' Letter from Myra R. Harris to Securities and Exchange Commission (June 2,
1983) (letter appended to Gai Robert Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug.
7, 1983)); El Jefe Gitano Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 12, 1983)
(original syndication agreement provided for futurity trust, which was eliminated after
SEC refused to issue no-action letter).
439 U.S. 551 (1979).
-9Id. at 561-62.
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or $31 million of the fund), the Court found that "a far larger
portion of ... [the benefits for the plan participants] comes
from employer contributions, a source in no way dependent on
the efforts of the Fund's managers." 30 The Court bolstered its
conclusion that the fourth element of the Howey test was missing
by finding that any "profit would depend primarily on the
employee's efforts to meet the vesting requirements, rather than
'3
the fund's investment success. 1
This appears analogous to the futurity funds, in which the
co-owner's expectation of profits depends principally on a fund
generated by contributions from other co-owners (as opposed to
income from the fund itself) and on the co-owner's ability to
breed, raise and show a champion horse. Because these factors
are entirely outside the syndicate manager's control, it is improper to conclude that the efforts of the syndicate manager or
the futurity fund tmanager are the undeniably significant ones.
As a result, the fourth element of Howey is not satisfied.
It is interesting to note that securities administrators in at
least two states have concluded that futurity funds do not cause
syndicate shares to fall into the definition of a security. Texas
reached that decision in what appears to be a traditional breeding
syndicate.12 The Kentucky Division of Securities reached a sima3
ilar conclusion in a less traditional setting.
The Commission also refuses to take a no-action position
34
with regard to any syndicate agreement containing a sales clause.
These provisions, which may occur in either breeding or racing
syndicate agreements, authorize the sale of the syndicated animal
upon the vote of a certain percentage of the co-owners.
Although it is difficult to understand the Commission's reasoning on this matter, it apparently is based on the idea that the
syndicate manager may arrange a sale of the horse and thereby

'

Id. at 562.
'4Id.

BLUE SKY L. REp. (CCH)
55,802 (Dec. 9, 1982).
Select Seven Syndicate, No-Action Letter from Kentucky Department of Banking
and Securities, 2 BLUE SKY L. REp. (CCH) 27,561 (Oct. 20, 1982).
4 Threat's Supreme A and Super Stock Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 11, 1985); Syndication of Daniri, SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 26,
1984); Bay Hilal Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 15, 1984); El Jefe
Gitano Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available Dec. 23, 1983).
"

3
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raise the significance of his role sufficiently to meet the fourth
element of the Howey test. a5 This position, however, not only
reflects a complete misunderstanding of the realities of syndicates, but also is inconsistent with the very essence of the Howey
test.
Sales provisions, especially in breeding syndicates, are rarely
used to sell the horse and are, therefore, generally insignificant
to the syndicates.3 6 More importantly, the Commission's position
is actually antithetical to the Howey doctrine. The whole purpose
of the Howey standard is to include in the definition of a security
arrangements in which investors are primarily passive, dependent
upon someone else for their expected profit. A corollary is that
an investor controlling his own destiny and maling his own
managerial decisions does not need the protection of the securities acts. 37 Sales provisions permit sale upon vote of the coowners and do not delegate that decision to the syndicate manager. The provisions, therefore, actually increase the co-owners'
control by involving them in the decision to sell and should
reduce the possibility that such syndicates involve securities.
The Commission, however, seems intent on clinging to its
position on sales clauses. Recently, this writer sought a no-action
letter regarding a syndicate with a sales clause. In the request
letter and in telephone conversations with the staff, arguments
were made that the sales provision should not cause the syndicate
to constitute a security. Although one staff member was sympathetic, the Commission refused to budge from its position,
indicating that it felt bound by stare decisis.3 8
11In one response the staff stated that "there appears to be a potential investment
aspect involved by virtue of the fact that the stallion may be sold and the profits divided
under certain circumstances." El Jefe Gitano Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available
Dec. 23, 1983).
11 Recently this writer was involved in the amendment of a major breeding syndicate to remove a sales provision from the syndicate agreement. This was done to
obtain a no-action letter from the Commission regarding the resales of the fractional
interests. The amendment was effected easily, and it was apparent that the syndicate

members either were not aware of the provision or considered it completely unimportant.
17Of course, courts recognize that allocation of control to investors lessens the
need for the protection of the securities acts. See, e.g., Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d
404, 423-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp.,
540 F.2d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 1976).
3 For a description of other positions taken by the Commission regarding horse
syndications, see Campbell, supra note 1, 1146-58.
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SHARES

IN RACING SYNDICATES AS SECURITIES

Generally

The Commission's positions regarding pooling,3 9 futurity
funds ° and sales clauses4' indicate that any variation from the
traditional breeding syndicate is unlikely to pass muster with the
staff. As a result, it seems certain that the Commission will
conclude that an interest in a racing syndicate is a security, if
the syndicate manager is delegated the breadth of responsibility
described in Section I of this Article (these racing syndicates in
which broad management power is delegated to the syndicate
manager are hereinafter referred to as "broad delegation racing
42
syndicates").
The more difficult and interesting question, however, is
whether existing case law justifies such a conclusion. Although
it is obviously difficult to generalize, there are arguments against
including a broad delegation racing syndicate in the definition
of a security, especially if the broad delegation racing syndicate
is the prelude to a stallion breeding syndicate.
Howey provides the primary analysis here, and the critical
component of the Howey test is the fourth element. 43 That
element, as explained in Koscot, requires that the investor's
expectation of profits depend on the efforts of the promoter or
third party (in this case, the syndicate manager) and that those
efforts be the "undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-

' See note 19 supra.
• See note 27 supra.
4' See note 34 supra.
42 It is interesting that no one has ever requested a no-action letter from the
Commission for a traditional racing syndicate of the type described in section one of
this Article. There was one request, however, in a situation in which the syndicate was
structured like a general partnership. See Especial Effects Syndication, SEC No-Action
Letter (available May 20, 1983). There were also requests in which the racing syndicates
were preludes to a stallion breeding syndicate, with all expenses and prizes of racing
paid by and to the original owner. See, e.g., Cals Neat Star Syndicate, SEC No-Action
Letter (available July 17, 1985).
11But see Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985)
(finding no common enterprise in a breeding syndicate).
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prise." It is not clear that the syndicate manager's function in
a broad delegation racing syndicate always reaches that level of
importance.
There are normally three bases for an investor's expectation
of profits. First, profits may be derived from the efforts of the
promoter (or syndicate manager, in the case of a racing syndicate); second, profits may be derived from the investor's own
efforts or activities; and, finally, profits may come from other
sources or forces, such as inflation or appreciation in the value
of property. 45 An investor's expectation of profits from a racing
syndicate may well depend on all three of these sources, and as
a result, it may be difficult to conclude that the syndicate manager's efforts are sufficiently significant to meet the Koscot
standard.46
Undoubtedly, a co-owner's expectation of profits from a
broad delegation racing syndicate depends to some extent on the
syndicate manager's efforts. The syndicate manager, it is assumed, exercises control over the horse's racing career, and a
successful racing career can generate profits for the co-owners
in the form of purses and can increase the value of the horse as
a breeding animal.

- SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Glenn W. Turner Ent., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482
(9th Cir. 1973)).
11There is authority indicating that an expectation of profits solely from appreciation in the value of assets is not sufficient to qualify the investment as a security.
See Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736, 740 n.4 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1203 (1983) (limited partnership interest not a security because investor had equal vote
in partnership decision to sell property and investor was not dependent on entrepreneurial
abilities of others); McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 78485 (N.D. Calif. 1983) (investor's claim that interest in apartment complex was a security
was neither insubstantial nor frivolous).
- This is the analysis that was used by the Supreme Court in International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniels, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). There the Court found that a pension
fund participant's expectation of payments depended on the income generated by the
fund manager, contributions by the employer and the participant's ability to meet the
vesting requirements of the plan. After evaluating these three factors, however, the Court
concluded that the fourth element of the Howey test was not met, since "a far larger
portion of ... [the participant's benefits] comes from employer contributions, a source
in no way dependent on the efforts of the Fund's manager ... [and] profit would
depend primarily on the employee's efforts to meet the vesting requirements, rather than
the Fund's investment success." Id. at 561-62.
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Recognizing this still does not resolve the question of whether
the efforts of the syndicate manager are the "undeniably significant" ones, because the other two sources of profits, as described above, can also be significant in broad delegation racing
syndicates. For example, if a racing syndicate is a prelude to a
stallion breeding syndicate, investors invariably anticipate that
exercising their breeding rights under the syndicate agreement
will generate their principal source of revenue, and the co-owners
will depend substantially on their own efforts at that point.
Similarly, other forces outside the control of a syndicate manager
are significant, including, most obviously, the syndicated horse's
speed, health, durability, virility and natural appreciation (if any)
in value. Although some of these factors may depend to some
extent on the syndicate manager's care, they are largely beyond
anyone's control.
Evaluating the relative importance of the these profit components in any particular situation will necessarily require careful
analysis. The point, however, is that broad delegation racing
syndicates do not always fall clearly into the definition of a
security, especially when the racing of a colt is the prelude to a
stallion breeding syndicate. In that instance, the syndicate manager's efforts may not be the undeniably significant ones, because the importance of other factors, including the co-owners'
participation at the breeding stage, may be sufficient to remove
the transaction from the definition of a security. 47

While one can muster these arguments, there is considerable
ambiguity in even the best situations and considerable risk in
proceeding under an assumption that a broad delegation racing
4' Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S.
551 (1982), also provides a basis to argue
that an interest in a racing syndicate is not a security, although, admittedly, the lack of

judicial craftsmanship and the confusion in the case should cause one to be wary. In
that case, the plaintiffs had pledged a certificate of deposit to the bank in exchange for

an agreement to pay the plaintiffs 50076 of the net profits from a corporation. In holding
that the plaintiffs had not purchased a security, the Court arguably limited the definition

of a security in situations involving "unusual instruments" to situations in which the
instruments had "equivalent values to most persons and could have been traded publicly." Id. at 559-60.
Typically, racing syndicates are attractive only to people actively engaged in the
horse business, especially when the residual breeding component is the real value in such

syndicates. As a result, investments in racing syndicates normally do not have equivalent
values to investors.
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syndicate is not a security. Thus, the better course is either to
make adjustments in the syndicate agreement, in order to reduce
the risk that the syndicate constitutes a security, or to treat the
syndicate as a security and qualify for an exemption from the
registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933
Act' ").4s
B. Adjustments to Avoid Inclusion in the Definition
of a Security
There are at least two adjustments that can be made in a
broad delegation racing syndicate to reduce the risk that interests
in the syndicate will be considered securities.
The first technique is for the syndicate agreement to provide
that earnings from races (or shows, if the horse is a performance
animal) are not shared with the co-owners but are, instead,
retained by the original owners of the horse. 49 This technique
has been used in racing syndicates when the horse's retirement
and breeding are anticipated in the foreseeable future. Racing,
therefore, is clearly a prelude to a breeding syndicate, which
becomes effective upon the retirement of the horse.so
This technique is simple and straightforward and has the
imprimatur of the Commission." Unfortunately, it also may
eviscerate a racing syndicate, because investors are substantially
eliminated from financial and emotional participation in the
horse's racing career. This technique changes the essence of a
racing syndicate into a deferred breeding syndicate and is, as a
result, often unacceptable.
A second way to reduce the risk that a racing syndicate
constitutes a security is to limit the syndicate manager's responsibilities and increase the co-owner's involvement in the horse's

• The Securities Act of 1933, c. 38, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a) [hereinafter referred to as "1933 Act"].
4' See Cals Neat Star Syndicate, SEC No-Action Letter (available July 17, 1985);
Shorty Lena Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 24, 1983);
Himito Dancer Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Feb. 5, 1982);
Blaze Drift Syndicate Agreement, SEC No-Action Letter (available Oct. 29, 1981).
10Of course, the terms of the breeding syndicate must otherwise meet the Com-

mission's requirements for the issuance of a no-action letter.
11See note 49 supra.
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management. This is an attempt to negate the existence of the
fourth element of Howey by reducing the importance of the
syndicate manager's responsibilities below the Koscot standard.
Although the cases supporting such a strategy involve an
eclectic group of entities and transactions, a broad rule seems
to emerge from the decisions. Courts generally are unwilling to
find a security in instances in which partners, joint venturers or
property owners delegate considerable managerial authority to
third parties, provided that the partners, joint venturers or property owners retain effective ultimate control. While the courts
insist that the owners be capable of actually exercising control
over the person to whom power is delegated, delegations of
considerable breadth and importance have been upheld.5 2 Some
examples are instructive.
In Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc. 5 a franchisee
purchased a restaurant franchise from Mr. Steak. Mr. Steak
retained a substantial amount of control over the franchise operation and, it appears, actually ran the restaurant. Nonetheless,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a
securities claim, emphasizing that "the franchise agreement and
the restaurant manager's agreement contemplated that River City
Steak [the franchisee] would play an active, if severely circumscribed, role in the conduct of the restaurant. 5 4 Thus, although
the franchisee delegated effective day-to-day control to Mr. Steak,
the franchisor, the court did not find a security present.
In Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp.,5 the Eighth Circuit affirmed a dismissal of a securities claim in a real estate transaction. Fargo Partners purchased an apartment complex from
Candletree, a partnership that retained complete management
control over the operation of the complex. The court concluded

"1 In addition to the cases described in notes 53-65 infra and accompanying text,
see also Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1978) (transaction whereby
purchaser of apartment complex contracted management agreement denying purchaser

the unilateral right to cancel the management contract with vendors within its three year
term, held not to be an "investment contract" where purchaser, who had considerable

business expertise, retained ultimate control over the apartment complex).
460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 669 (quoting Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640,
645 (D.C. Co. 1970)).
" 540 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1976).
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that the deal did not involve a security, because "Fargo's role
was a significant one despite the management contract. 5 6 The
reservation by Fargo of the right to fire Candletree as manager
on thirty days notice was important to that conclusion. The
court stated that "[w]hether [Fargo] ... chose to exercise that
right or was content to give Candletree a free hand is irrelevant;
'5 7
the power to control the business was in Fargo's hands.
Again, the retention of effective 8 ultimate control was sufficient
to avoid inclusion in the definition of a security, even though
there was delegation of substantial operational functions.5 9
Finally, in Williamson v. Tucker,6° a Fifth Circuit decision
that must be considered one of the leading cases in this area,
three joint venturers each purchased a one-third undivided interest in certain real estate. The purpose of the joint venture was
to hold the land for subsequent development or resale. Godwin
Investments, which arranged all of the transactions and sold the
interest in the land to one of the joint venturers, represented
that it would perform all management functions with regard to
the property, attempt to have the land rezoned and pursue the
sale or development of the property. The joint venture agreements, however, reserved certain powers for the joint venturers,
including most importantly the power to approve any plan of
development and the power to remove Godwin as manager.
In remanding the case, the court discussed extensively the
substantive issues involved. The court concluded that in the
absence of certain "limited circumstances ... meaningful powers possessed by joint venturers under a joint venture agreement
do indeed preclude a finding that joint venture interests are
securities." ' 6' Those limited circumstances exist when:

,6

Id. at 915.

57

Id.

's Fargo's sophistication also impressed the court. "Fargo's investment in this
enterprise was over three million dollars, and it had made other investments in the past.

This is not a case where a small investor is helplessly reliant on the promotor's efforts
because of a lack of business knowledge, finances or control over the operation." Id.
9 In a subsequent case, the Eighth Circuit described Fargo Partnersin the following terms: ".... the investor demonstrated his ultimate control over the complex by
reserving the right to manage the business. It was irrelevant whether he chose to exercise
the right or not." Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1978).
-0645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
61 Id. at 425.
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(I) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in

the hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in
fact distributes power as would a limited partnership; or (2)

the partner or venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in the business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently
exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner
or venturer is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or
managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot

replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise
meaningful partnership or venture powers. 62

The court found none of these factors present.6 3 Again, it seems
that the power reserved for the joint venturers gave them effective ultimate control, even though there were substantial managerial responsibilities allocated to Godwin.
These cases provide a basis for an effective strategy to reduce
the risk that a racing syndicate involves a security. Implementation of such a strategy necessitates adjustments in the terms
of a broad delegation syndicate agreement, and in that regard,
provisions for the following should be made in the syndicate
agreement. First, the co-owners should be permitted to replace
the syndicate manager by a majority vote. Second, the co-owners
should retain the power to amend the syndicate agreement by a
majority vote. This would include, of course, the authority to
amend the delegation of authority to the syndicate manager.
Third, major decisions, such as retirement of the horse from the
track, the sale of the horse and the selection of the trainer,
should require majority approval of the co-owners. Fourth, the
syndicate manager should be obligated to provide material information about the horse to the co-owners on a reasonably
prompt basis. Finally, the fractional interests should not be sold
to persons that are so inexperienced or unknowledgeable that
they are incapable of exercising the syndicate powers.
While the writer is convinced that the foregoing strategy is
sound and can be adapted to many situations, it is not, unfortunately, a panacea. Certain clients, for example, will not tolerate sharing such control over the syndicated animal's racing

'

Id. at 424.

"Id.
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career. They, as the horse's original owners, may believe, often
with good reasons, that they know most about the horse and
may insist on an essentially unfettered right to direct the horse's
racing career.
One must also understand that the strategy outlined above
does not eliminate all vestiges of risk. 4 Obviously the determination of whether the co-owners retain sufficient control to avoid
inclusion in the definition of a security is an exceedingly factual
judgment. Thus, the possibility always exists that a court may
conclude that the particular racing syndicate constitutes a security, 65 especially if the court's philosophical predilections regarding the coverage of the securities laws differ, for example, from
those of the court in Williamson.
Notwithstanding such limitations, racing syndicates drafted
pursuant to the foregoing suggestions should not be considered
securities. As a policy matter, investors in such racing syndicates
have the power, information and sophistication to control their

The Commission, for example, is unwilling to issue a no-action letter for such
a racing syndicate.
In one request to the Commission for a no-action letter regarding a racing syndicate
formed for a quarter horse, it was represented that the syndicate agreement spread all
management control among the 50 proposed co-owners. The request letter stated that:
The Members of the Syndicate totally control all aspects of the business
of the Syndicate, including, without limitation, the election of the Syndicate
Manager or Managers and all decisions regarding the board, care, management, maintenance, breeding, training, racing and location of the horse.
The day-to-day management of the Syndicate shall be delegated to a
Syndicate Manager elected by the Members. The Syndicate Manager shall
at all times be subject to the control of the Members and may be removed
by the Members at any time with or without cause.
The letter also represented that the Members would have "special and extensive knowledge and experience in the horse industry and in the business of breeding horses." See
Letter from Alan R. Miller to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 17, 1983)
(letter appended to Especial Effects Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available May
20, 1983)). Notwithstanding these representations, the staff refused to take any position
on the matter. Especial Effects Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available May 20,
1983).
63 There are also cases in which courts have found a security, even though inventors
retained some control or participated in the operation of the business. See, e.g., Cameron
v. Outdoor Resorts of America, 608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979) (exclusive right of condominium campsite vendor to rent campsite in owner's absence required that campsite
be considered a security); Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979) (agreement to
repurchase offspring of earthworms sold to investor was an investment contract subject
to securities laws).
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own destinies and do not need the special protections of the
disclosure and fraud provisions of the securities laws. Delegation
to the syndicate manager of day-to-day responsibilities regarding
the horse's racing career should not change this analysis. The
modifications suggested herein indicate that effective ultimate
control is in the hands of the co-owners and should avoid any
of the "limited circumstances" described in Williamson as a
basis for concluding that such a venture is a security.
CONCLUSION

While this writer is convinced that functional racing syndicates can be designed to fall outside the definition of a security,
he is equally convinced that one should not, merely to achieve
such a result, tolerate unnecessary levels of risk under the securities laws or accede to unacceptable or troublesome terms.
One has the option to treat the interests in the racing syndicates
as securities and comply with the provisions of the 1933 Act and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 66
The registration requirements of the 1933 Act, 67 which normally present the most burdensome problem in such instances, 6
can be met by compliance with any one of a number of exemp-

The Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, c. 404, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a) [hereinafter referred to as "1934 Act"].
" The registration provisions of the 1933 Act provide that one offering or selling
securities must file a registration statement with the Commission and comply with the
prospectus delivery requirements, unless an exemption is available from the registration
and prospectus delivery requirements. The general registration provision in the 1933 Act
is found at 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1982). The statutory exemptions from registration are
found in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(c) and (d).
The time and expense associated with a registration statement typically make that
alternative impractical. Thus, persons structuring racing syndicates generally need to
qualify such deals for an exemption from registration. For information regarding the
process of registration, see H. BLOOMENTHAL, C. HARVEY & S. WING, 1984 GOING
PUBLIC HANDBOOK §§ 6.01-13 (1984). For a somewhat dated but still excellent discussion
of the registration process, see I L. Loss, SEcuirrIas REGULATION 159-351 (2d ed. 1961).
- One must, of course, also comply with the antifraud provisions of the -1933 Act
and the 1934 Act. Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984), and §
12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(2) are the most significant of such antifraud
provisions. These provisions, however, are substantially less burdensome than the registration provisions because the antifraud requirements are satisfied if the issuer refrains
from making material misstatements and discloses all material facts. See id.
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tions,69 the most significant of which are the exemptions
provided by Regulation D. 70 Although Regulation D is not

without its fair share of problems, 7 it typically provides
an attractive exemption from the registration requirements
of the 1933 Act and normally works reasonably well for
the sale of interests in racing syndicates. Experience
teaches

that

problems

of

disclosure, 72

timing 73

and

" In addition to Regulation D (see note 70 infra for a discussion of Regulation
D) exemptions with broad applicability include rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1985),
(the interstate exemption); § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (the statutory exemption for nonpublic offers and sales); and § 4(6), id. § 77d(6) (offerings limited only to accredited
investors). The requirements of these exemptions, however, generally make them either
unavailable or unattractive for structuring racing syndicates, and as a result, Regulation
D is the principal exemption used.
7' Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-.506, actually contains three separate but
related exemptions from registration. All three exemptions require essentially private
offers and sales and, accordingly, prohibit any general advertising in connection with
the offering, restrict the resale of securities and require the issuer to take certain steps
to insure that the securities are not resold publicly. In addition, each rule has its own
requirements, which become more onerous as the deals become larger.
Rule 504, id. § 230.504, allows sales up to $500,000.00 with no limitation on the
number of purchases, no disclosure requirements and no purchaser qualification requirements. Rule 505, id. § 230.505, permits sales up to $5 million, limits the number of
unaccredited purchasers to 35, normally requires that the issuer deliver to the investor
the same information that would be contained in a Form S-18 but contains no purchaser
qualification requirements.
Rule 506, id. § 230.506, is available for offerings in excess of $5 million, normally
requires disclosures that are more extensive than the Rule 505 disclosures, imposes
purchaser qualification requirements and also limits the number of unaccredited purchasers to 35.
For a discussion of Regulation D, see J. Hicis, 1985 LIITED OmRING EXBPApTIONS: REGULATION D (1985); Wertheimer, Small Issuers: Updated on Regulation D, 15
INST. ON SEC. REG. 377-441 (1983).
, See generally, Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others) Under Regulation D, 74 Ky. L.J. 127 (1985-86).
" Disclosure is a prerequisite to the availability of a Regulation D exemption,
unless the deal is either less than $500,000 or is sold only to "accredited investors." 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(b). Even in instances in which Regulation D does not require disclosure,
however, issuers typically use a somewhat abbreviated offering circular to protect against
a violation of the federal antifraud provisions. See Campbell, An Open Attack on the
Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 559-62 (1985). Meeting the
disclosure requirements of Regulation D or of the antifraud provisions adds time and
expense to any deal. Although these added burdens are not always insignificant, neither
are they necessarily insurmountable to the formation of a racing syndicate. For a
discussion of these matters, see notes 73-74 infra.
' Timing is often critical in the formation of a racing syndicate, and compliance
with disclosure requirements is considered one of the principal obstacles to expediency.
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expenses,7 4 all of which appear burdensome in Regulation D
offerings, are manageable in most instances. Finally, the problems of restrictions on resales of securities purchased under
Regulation D,7 which can cause significant impediments to the
use of the Regulation D exemptions,7 6 now appear less burdensome. A recent no-action letter from the Commission accepted
a theory that allows resales substantially sooner than the normal
77
holding period otherwise applicable to restricted securities.

If disclosure is required as a prerequisite to the availability of Regulation D, see 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(b) and note 71 supra, a competent firm operating under reasonable
conditions should be able to complete a racing syndicate in about four weeks. In
situations in which disclosure is not required by the terms of Regulation D but is instead
provided only to meet the antifraud provisions, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) and note 71
supra, even less time is required to effect disclosure, because the offering circular utilized
to satisfy the antifraud provisions is substantially less extensive than the offering circular
required by Regulation D. Finally, it is not necessary to have disclosure documents
completed at the time the selling effort is commenced. Regulation D allows offers to be
made prior to any disclosure, so long as disclosure is completed before sale. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.502(b). This technique, therefore, allows the issuer to start the selling campaign
almost instantaneously, with disclosure documents to be supplied prior to the completion
of the sale. Most deals can tolerate these limitations.
14 As with the problem of timing, the expenses in structuring a racing syndicate
within the requirements of Regulation D depend in large part on the amount of disclosure
that is required. In today's dollars, the securities work on a Regulation D deal not
involving mandated disclosure (i.e., an offering in which disclosure is not a prerequisite
to the availability of Regulation D) may be $10,000.00. This assumes no unusual
problems with the deal, a cooperative client and that an abbreviated offering circular is
utilized to avoid problems under antifraud provisions. If Regulation D requires disclosure, the cost of the securities work could easily double, or it could even be more.
Although these are not insignificant costs, they may seem less burdensome in the
contexts of particular deals. For example, $10,000.00 is only 2% of a $500,000.00 deal
and 1% of a $1 million deal. Many racing syndicates are able to endure these fees.
" Securities purchased under Regulation D "shall have the status of securities
acquired in a transaction under Section 4(2). . . and cannot be resold without registration
under the [1933] Act or an exemption therefrom." 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).
', For a critical discussion of the resale restrictions applicable to Regulation D
offerings, see Campbell, supra note 71, at 147-61.
7' Counsel for the Devil's Bag Syndicate requested a no-action letter for the resale
of fractional interests in the Devil's Bag Syndicate. The syndicate was originally formed
as a broad delegation racing syndicate, with provisions for a breeding syndicate to
become effective following the colt's retirement from the track. The fractional interests
were purchased pursuant to Regulation D and held for approximately one year. During
that time, however, Devil's Bag had been retired from racing and was therefore governed
under the terms of the syndicate agreement covering the breeding of the stallion.
Counsel argued that the shares should no longer be considered securities because
the syndicate agreement was then a typical breeding syndicate, which under the Coin-
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One fashioning a racing syndicate, therefore, has various
alternatives in meeting the requirements of federal securities
laws. By adjusting the provisions of the broad delegation racing
syndicates or by meeting the requirements of Regulation D, one
normally can construct a racing syndicate that provides an acceptable level of protection, retains the essential elements of the
syndicate and meets the clients' cost and timing requirements.

mission's own determination did not involve a security. Thus, counsel essentially was
arguing that the security disappeared when the horse was retired, because at that point
the efforts of the syndicate manager were no longer the undeniably significant ones
under the Howey-Koscot test.
After a certain amount of negotiation over peripheral matters, the Commission
accepted this argument and issued its no-action letter. See Devil's Bay Syndicate, SEC
No-Action Letter (available Mar. 4, 1985).
The practical impact of this is significant, because it may, in many instances,
dramatically reduce the holding period for interests in racing syndicates originally purchased under Regulation D. Persons investing in racing syndicates in Regulation D
offerings should now feel comfortable selling their fractional interests as soon as the
horse is retired from the track. In many instances, that will occur reasonably quickly,
as was the case, for example, with Devil's Bag and Spend A Buck.
In addition, investors who can meet the applicable criteria can resell in three years
under Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 240.144, or at any time under the so called "Section 4(1
1/2)" exemption. For a discussion of the "Section 4(1 1/2)" criteria, see Campbell,
supra note 71, at 147-51.

